

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7

## DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION

February 12, 1948

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploitation upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this purpose, CIA will maintain a central index of non-governmental sources in the United States.

b. Establish uniform procedures and standards for security clearance of all contacts in this field, and arrange such clearances.

c. Establish uniform procedures to insure that the interests of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized.

d. Collect through the establishment of field offices within the United States, foreign intelligence information required in the interests of the national security or by the individual intelligence agencies.

e. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency representatives and non-governmental sources within the United States whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence information.

f. Obtain the agreement of responsible policy-making officials of American organizations having a foreign intelligence potential before establishing and maintaining contacts within that organization.

g. Inform the intelligence agencies of the prospective departure from or return to the United States of selected American citizens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agencies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.

h. Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign intelligence information obtained through this program. Reports produced by the agencies shall be identified as such, unless the originating agency stipulates to the contrary.

3. Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:

a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, representatives to serve their interests under the direction of the CIA managers. Member agencies may, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their Regional Offices and CIA Field Offices.

b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for collection all their requests for foreign intelligence information to be obtained from non-governmental sources within the United States.

c. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with non-governmental sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number.

d. Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their departments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent possible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate dissemination.

e. Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing security regulations, from their departments and agencies information concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States having foreign intelligence potential, which the department or agency possesses or subsequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central Intelligence Agency.

f. Nominate representatives to serve on a committee, under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodically to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program.

4. Further to implement this undertaking, the National Security Resources Board and the components of the Military Establishment, other than the components represented on the JAC, shall furnish directly to the CIA, to the maximum extent possible, all foreign intelligence information which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States, in connection with non-intelligence activities.

5. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the Departments and Agencies with business concerns, other non-governmental organizations, and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information. Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of documents between libraries of the departments and other libraries, or the development of research projects with individuals or non-governmental institutions.

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